





































                                               
1  That number has fallen considerably over the past two decades to somewhere between 













Pagiola and Bosquet (2009) similarly explore different dimensions of REDD implementation 
costs. They highlight the opportunity cost of not converting forest into agricultural land, 
including loss of a source of timber; implementation costs that include prevention of illegal 
logging, or the relocation of timber harvesting activities; and transactions costs, that include 
negotiating contracts, and monitoring, reporting, and verifying emissions reductions. In 
paying considerable attention to the opportunity cost of REDD Pagiola and Bosquet (2009) 
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further show how to build a “national supply curve for REDD.” Olsen and Bishop (2009) 
detail the actual costs to investors of REDD.	
On-going	costs	REDD	proponents	and	the	literature	consistently	ignore	or	undervalue	costs	of	enforcing	access	restrictions	that	must	be	incurred	to	generate	avoided	deforestation.		Such	enforcement	requires	ongoing	expenditure	for	the	life	of	any	REDD	project	(Börner	et	al.,	2011,	2014).	Several	situations	create	particular	problems	with	enforcement	costs.		First,	in	settings	where	forests	communities	use	forests,	often	with	poorly	defined	de	facto	rights,	the	government	owner	of	the	land	must	choose	to	enforce	against	that	local	use	or	to	find	mechanisms	for	the	community	to	receive	payments	as	the	incentive.		Second,	in	settings	in	which	the	local	communities	have	defined	rights	and	participate	in	REDD,	“outsiders”	who	traditionally	used	a	now-REDD	forest	do	not	share	in	any	REDD	payments	or	associated	benefits	(Albers	and	Robinson,	2013;	Robinson	et	al.,	2014).		REDD	implementation	requires	communities	to	develop	group	self-enforcement	mechanisms	with	both	upfront	transactions	costs	and	ongoing	enforcement	costs.	In	addition,	the	communities	face	ongoing	enforcement	costs	to	prevent	outsider	extraction	in	settings	with	outsiders	as	important	drivers	of	forest	loss	or	develop	mechanisms	to	share	payments	with	those	people	to	create	an	incentive	for	lower	forest	use.		These	situations	create	the	potential	for	costly	conflict	–	an	often	ignored	cost	–	as	some	individuals	lose	access	to	the	forest	but	are	not	compensated	through	the	REDD	initiative	or	any	other	source	(Douglas	and	Simula,	2011;	Kane	et	al.	2017).	Rakatama	et	al.	(2017)	provides	a	comprehensive	review	of	REDD	costs	for	60	studies.	They	find	that	the	literature	continues	to	focus	on	opportunity	costs	(56	comparable	estimates),	with	less	than	half	the	sample	addressing	transactions	and	implementation	costs,	suggesting	that	the	cost	effectiveness	of	REDD	projects	is	thus	inflated.	Those	who	have	looked	for	the	“hidden	costs”	of	REDD	have	found	them	to	be	high.	Alston	and	Andersson	(2011)	provide	a	detailed	discussion	of	further	transactions	costs	of	REDD,	focusing	on	negotiating	contracts	with	landowners,	monitoring	outcomes,	and	enforcing	contracts,	which	take	the	mechanism	a	long	way	from	the	Coasean	ideal	of	a	PES.	Many	of	these	costs	must	be	incurred	after	a	country	is	“REDD	ready”.	They	highlight	the	costs	imposed	on	LMIC	governments	with	respect	to	monitoring	contractual	behavior.	Arguably,	treating	incentives	for	monitoring,	reporting,	and	verification	has	proven	difficult	in	part	because	buyers	and	sellers	of	carbon	credits	have	incentives	not	to	monitor	closely	(see	Richards	and	Andersson,	2001;	Alston	and	Andersson,	2011).	Luttrell	et	al.	(2018)	consider	costs	associated	with	22	subnational	REDD	initiatives	and	the	extent	to	which	the	costs	of	implementing	REDD	borne	by	those	in	LMICs	outweigh	REDD	carbon	payments.	The	authors	consider	start	up	and	running	costs,	including	MRV,	free	prior	informed	consent,	and	enforcement	costs,	in	addition	to	the	direct	payment	for	the	ecosystem	service.	They find that a	significant	portion	of	subnational	and	local	institutions	incur	high	costs	of	REDD+,	particularly	at	the	startup	phase.	











Benefit	sharing	at	the	community	level	Luttrell	et	al.	(2013)	place	benefit	sharing	as	a	central	design	element	of	REDD	because	how	payments	are	allocated	determines	the	required	incentives	for	people	to	reduce	their	emissions.	Similarly,	the	issue	of	property	rights	becomes	more	important	and	complex	when	implementing	REDD	at	the	scale	of	the	community.	Palmer	(2010)	writes	explicitly	of	the	need	for	the	creation	of	“common	property	carbon	rights”,	given	how	many	REDD	initiatives	(and	planned	initiatives)	are	located	in	areas	where	forests	are	held	under	common	property	regimes.	 Robinson	et	al.	(2016)	document	a	REDD	pilot	scheme	in	Tanzania	implemented	at	the	group	level	to	mimic	a	PES	in	which	payments	should	be	conditional	on	carbon	loss	avoided	and	valued	according	to	prices	in	the	carbon	markets.	The	payment	is	made	to	the	community,	reflecting	the	value	of	the	avoided	carbon	emissions,	and	each	member	of	the	community	receives	an	equal	share	of	that	payment,	regardless	of	the	costs	that	REDD	imposes	on	that	particular	individual	and	on	that	individual’s	reduction	of	forest	use.	Certainly,	some	individuals	will	be	harmed	differentially	by	the	constraints	imposed	by	the	REDD	scheme.	As	such,	the	approach	promotes	commitment	to	a	shared	and	more	equitable	future	rather	than	to	individual	incentives	for	forest	use	change.	Somerville	et	al.	(2010)	find	in	Madagascar	that	“community-based PES schemes offer 
a particular challenge, as incentives aimed to influence individual behavior . . . pass 
through community institutions” (p.1263). Mahanty	et	al.	(2013)	assess	seven	REDD	schemes	set	up	as	PES,	across	Africa,	Asia,	and	Latin	America,	from	a	total	of	44	candidate	REDD	PES	schemes.	They	find	formally	recgonised	use	rights	to	be	sufficient	for	communities	to	undertake	REDD	through	a	PES	agreement	in	Mexico	and	Mozambique.	However,	they	also	found	that	upfront	and	opportunity	costs	were	night	compared	to	the	PES	payments.	Mahanty	et	al.	(2013)	document	various	modalities	for	how	PES	funds	are	distributed	within	communities,	from	collective	contracts,	similar	to	
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Robinson	et	al.	(2016)	example	from	Tanzania,	through	to	payments	to	individual	contract	owners	and	to	community	trust	funds.	3.4 Funding	REDD			
The	complexities	of	REDD	funding,	as	documented	in	the	literature,	are	linked	to	the	complexities	of	implementing	REDD	(Blom	et	al.,	2010).	Two	stages	of	funding	have	been	identified	in	the	literature.	The	first,	funding	for	“readiness”	activities	described	above	almost	always	relies	on	public	funds,	as	upfront	payments	are	needed	to	enable	countries	and	communities	to	build	the	needed	capacity	to	be	in	a	position	to	link	funding	to	verified	reductions	in	emissions	and	to	cover	the	costs	of	being	REDD	ready.	The	second	stage	of	funding	links	to	the	payment	for	the	emissions	reductions	and	the	costs	of	protecting	the	REDD	forests.		The	broad	financial	options	to	support	REDD	include	fund	based,	market	based,	or	a	mixture	of	both	(Cerbu	et	al.,	2010),	with	funding	linked	to	the	implementation	of	REDD	activities	as	the	basis	for	a	performance-based	payments	at	the	national	level	(Skutsch	et	al.,	2017).	Individual	lower-income	countries	would	choose	how	to	achieve	the	contracted	amount	of	reduced	forest	loss	and	how	to	distribute	national-level	payments,	through	a	mix	of	national	and	sub-national	level	policies.	These	policies	could	be	ex	post	performance	based	or	could	employ	other	policies	to	reduce	emissions.	The	reality	has	resulted	in	complex	layered	approaches,	some	of	which	resemble	PES	and	others	that	do	not	(Pedroni	et	al.,	2009).	Market-based	mechanisms	could	link	forest	owners	in	lower-income	countries	looking	to	sell	REDD	credits	with	higher-income	countries	looking	to	offset	their	industrial	carbon	emissions.	Yet	the	emerging	reality	has	been	rather	different,	with	very	few	initiatives	able	to	sell	carbon	credits	(Lund	et	al.,	2017).	Indeed,	carbon	markets	have	played	a	very	small	role	in	REDD,	despite	REDD’s	origins	as	a	market-based	mechanism.	The	European	Emissions	Trading	System,	for	example,	does	not	accept	REDD	credits,	and	other	carbon	markets	may	follow	suit	(Boucher,	2015).	Some	REDD	pilot	projects	have	explicitly	looked	to	engage	directly	with	carbon	markets,	including	a	number	of	pilots	set	up	by	TFCG/MJUMITA	in	Tanzania	(Manyika	et	al.,	2013;	Robinson	et	al.,	2013).	However,	problems	with	verification	of	avoided	carbon,	and	the	relatively	low	price	of	carbon	in	the	voluntary	markets,	mean	that	the	villages	have	not	been	able	to	trade	in	the	carbon	markets	and	so	have	relied	on	dedicated	funds	that	mimic	the	markets	(Vatn	et	al.,	2017).	One	key	concern	with	regards	to	funding	REDD	through	carbon	markets	has	been	that	REDD	credits	could	flood	the	market	and	depress	the	carbon	price	yet	further	(Neeff	and	Ascui,	2009;	Skutsch	and	McCall,	2010).	Angelsen	et	al.	(2014)	addresses	how	this	risk	might	be	minimized.		The	reality	is,	however,	that	most	of	the	hundreds	of	REDD	projects	undertaken	so	far	have	been	funded	through	dedicated	multilateral	and	bilateral	agreements	(Fletcher	et	al.,	2016).	
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3.5 Efficiency,	equity,	and	ancillary	benefits		
The	choice	of	funding	mechanism	is	closely	linked	to	the	extent	to	which	REDD	will	generate	rents	for	lower-income	countries	and	particularly	communities	living	near	to	designated	REDD	forests,	or	whether	is	designed	to	compensate	individuals	for	the	costs	that	REDD	imposes	(Karsenty	et	al.,	2014).	Thus	funding	is	closely	linked	to	issues	of	equity	and	efficiency.	If	REDD	is	implemented	as	a	PES,	then	linking	REDD	to	carbon	trading	might	be	a	natural	next	step	(for	an	early	discussion,	see	Laurance,	2008)	with	efficient	funding	through	an	international	market	for	carbon	credits	with	direct	payments	to	forest	owners,	whether	individuals	or	groups	(Angelsen	et	al.,	2012).	In	such	a	situation,	the	forest	users	would	be	paid	the	value	of	avoided	carbon	emissions	and	would	engage	in	such	contracts	whenever	that	value	more	than	offsets	the	cost	imposed	by	fREDD.	There	have	been	suggestions	that	if	the	only	concern	for	REDD	were	reduced	carbon	emissions,	then	a	carbon-efficient	REDD	would,	for	example,	target	commercial	farming	and	ranching	in	many	Latin	American	countries.	Skutch	et	al.,	(2017)	suggest	that	the	benefits	from	avoided	deforestation	in	such	circumstances	are	likely	to	be	high,	the	costs	of	implementation	relatively	low,	yet	such	an	efficiency	focus	would	direct	REDD	funds	towards	relatively	richer	households	in	lower-income	countries.	Alternatively,	focusing	on	reducing	deforestation	caused	by	shifting	cultivation	would	be	more	likely	to	direct	REDD	funds	towards	poorer	farmers,	but	the	costs	of	administering	REDD	in	such	circumstances	where	many	smallholder	farmers	are	involved,	are	likely	to	be	high,	suggesting	that	such	a	focus	could	be	pro-poor	but	relatively	inefficient	(Skutch	et	al.,	2017).		In	Tanzania,	many	REDD	projects	are	being	implemented	locally	through	community-based	forest	management-type	structures.	This	approach	can	increase	the	likelihood	of	ancillary	community	benefits.	However,	REDD	could	be	implemented	in	government	forests	designated	as	important	for	species	and	biodiversity	conservation,	where	villagers	are	already	excluded,	if	imperfectly.	In	such	cases	REDD	could	provide	ancillary	ecosystem	benefits	at	a	relatively	low	implementation	cost	(Forest	trends,	2009;	Robinson	et	al.,	2013).		REDD	has	been	coopted	to	also	improve	forest-dependent	livelihoods,	biodiversity,	and	to	contribute	towards	sustainable	development	(Busch	et	al.,	2011;	Peterson	et	al.,	2012).	However,	Phelps	et	al.	(2012)	caution	that	policy	makers	will	face	trade	offs	where	high	carbon	and	high	biodiversity	forests	do	not	overlap	geographically	(see	also	Torres	et	al.,	2015).	There	is	scientific	evidence	that	biodiversity	conservation	is	needed	if	forest	carbon	stores	are	to	be	sustained	(Diaz	et	al.,	2009),	suggesting	the	linkages	between	carbon	sequestration	and	biodiversity	are	complex.	
4 Future	REDD	The	Paris	Agreement	has	“revived	attention	to	REDD”	(Sunderlin	et	al.,	2018).	Yet	in	a	post-Paris	COP	world,	it	is	not	clear	how	REDD	will	evolve,	and	more	broadly,	the	extent	to	which	or	how	natural	forests	will	continue	to	be	explicitly	included	in	climate	agreements	through	REDD	initiatives.	Critiques	of	REDD	are	many	and	varied.	Some	of	the	earlier	critiques	originated	from	a	“moral”	stance:	should	higher-income	countries	
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be	able	to	offset	their	emissions	with	support	for	lower-income	forests	through	carbon	markets.	Others	highlight	objections	to	the	commodification	of	nature	and	REDD	as	a	market-based	instrument	(Fletcher	et	al.,	2016).	Other	critiques	are	oriented	towards	the	reality	of	REDD	playing	out	very	differently	from	the	concept,	often	due	to	the	under-estimation	of	how	costly	REDD	would	be.	Still	others	point	to	the	co-opting	of	REDD	onto	the	causes	of	biodiversity	conservation,	poverty	reduction,	and	sustainable	development,	thus	diluting	the	original	concept	that	REDD	is	about	climate	change	and	reducing	carbon	emissions.		REDD	has	been	accused	of	being	a	“green	grab”	(Fairhead	et	al.,	2012),	an	excuse	to	dispossess	local	peoples.	Despite	these	criticisms	REDD,	most	likely,	is	not	dead.	However,	one	can	perhaps	find	in	the	literature	a	consensus	emerging	that	REDD	is	imperfect,	imprecise,	and	implemented	in	a	myriad	of	ways.	Concern	has	been	voiced	in	the	literature	that	REDD	has	not	lived	up	to	its	expectations.		Angelsen	et	al.	(2017)	suggests	that	REDD	has	not	delivered	the	tangible	results	that	were	expected	of	it,	and	raises	important	issues	with	respect	to	how	REDD	has	evolved	over	time.	The	reality	of	many	REDD	schemes	is	that	they	have	moved	far	from	the	ideals	of	a	PES	scheme,	whether	with	respect	to	the	voluntary	aspect	of	PES,	or	with	respect	to	the	idea	that	payments	are	for	results	rather	than	effort.	For	example,	Skutsch	et	al.	(2017)	propose	upfront	“fair	compensation”	as	more	appropriate	than	ex	post	results-based	payments.			Many	REDD	initiatives	are	occurring	at	the	individual	community	or	forest	level,	and	resemble	earlier	efforts	to	protect	forests,	such	as	ICDPs,	Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	Programmes	and	participatory	forest	management	(Blom	et	al.,	2010).	Indeed,	though	REDD	was	initially	developed	explicitly	as	a	carbon	mitigation	tool	that	places	an	economic	value	on	forest	carbon	sequestration	in	lower-income	countries,	REDD,	and	particularly	its	manifestation	as	REDD+	is	increasingly	conceptualised	as	in	the	context	of	sustainable	development	(van	der	Hoff	et	al.,	2015).	Turnhout	et	al.	(2017)	suggests	that	a	“heterodox	REDD+	may	provide	building	blocks	for	the	polycentric	governance	of	the	world’s	remaining	tropical	forests”.			This	morphing	of	REDD	away	from	its	initial	conceptualization	towards	a	local	forest	management	approach	is	likely	to	dilute	its	impact	on	climate	change	and	increase	the	complexity	of	implementation.	It	also	seems	to	move	REDD	far	from	where	efforts	to	stem	forest	loss	might	start	from:	an	understanding	of	the	drivers	of	forest	loss,	many	of	which	are	external	to	the	forest	sector.	Most	of	the	attention	of	REDD,	and	so	the	REDD	literature,	is	focused	squarely	on	the	forest	sector,	and	much	attention	is	on	protecting	the	sector	rather	than	reducing	the	external	pressures.	Robinson	et	al.	(2013)	highlight	the	need	to	take	into	account	whether	the	drivers	of	forest	loss	are	internal	or	external	to	a	particular	forest	landscape,	when	determining	the	best	approach	to	implementing	REDD.	If	the	drivers	are	external	but	efforts	are	focused	on	a	particular	set	of	forests,	REDD	is	in	danger	of	“becom[ing]	an	enforcement	programme	that	faces	similar	issues	to	all	previous	“fence	and	fine”	deforestation	prevention	programmes”	(Robinson	et	al.,	2013:	p142).	
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